The CIRAS CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING FOR SAFETY newsletter

EDITION 46
May/June 2013

CIRAS is confidential reporting service that supports subscribing organisations safety management systems with regard to safety reporting.

A safety net if all else fails

www.ciras.org.uk

Mobile Technology

Where does it belong in the rail industry?

Technology has completely transformed the way we live. Information is ever more accessible and many daily tasks can be performed anywhere and at any time. Easy access to the internet through the use of smartphones, tablets and MP3 players, helps us to communicate and provides a means of entertainment. But with so many potential sources of distraction, it is easy to lose focus and typically straightforward and routine tasks can result in potentially catastrophic accidents.



The use of mobile phones for car drivers has been identified as a major cause of serious road accidents. Despite this, their use remains widespread and the government plan to introduce tougher legislations to address this in 2014. Hands free equipment has been developed but the evidence available suggests that phone conversations are distracting even when hands are free.

Inevitably, the rail industry has also been impacted by the continual development of technology. Many work-related tasks are now performed using an electronic device. Examples of uses for tablets include: clocking on and off at the beginning and end of shifts, registering HR issues, reporting incidents and recording job details. These are legitimate uses of mobile devices and it is easy to see how modern technology can make work-related tasks easier and more efficient.

As these new ways of working are encouraged in some operational roles, the question of responsibility and risks that surround the use of such technology must also be raised. In 2008, there was an incident at Chatsworth, California where a Metrolink Train Driver caused an accident that resulted in 25 deaths, including his own. An additional 105 passengers were also injured. The post-incident investigation revealed that the Driver had been texting just moments before he collided head-on with a freight train, after passing a protecting signal at danger.

An investigation of recent accident and incident trends in railway and public transportation operations in the United States by Atticus Consulting Group LLC (Atticus), found that a significant number of rule violations, accidents and employee fatalities involve failures of human attention. They suggest that such human errors are due to constraints in the way that our brains operate in repetitive and routine situations, such as those found throughout railway and public transport operations.

IN THIS ISSUE

CIRAS spoke to Alan Jardine, Head of Operational Safety at ScotRail, about the use of mobile phones and tablets by their operational staff.

Jardine informed us that ScotRail currently issue mobile phones to their Conductors but not to their Train Drivers. The message is clear from ScotRail; unauthorised use of a mobile phone or electronic device is a significant distraction and considerably increases the risk of an accident occurring.

Jardine acknowledges that some companies do issue mobile communication equipment and that employees are likely to carry their own personal devices, therefore the temptation can always be present. He added that currently, ScotRail are commencing a trial with Train Conductors using tablets in one of its depots.

Consistently through all TOCs, FOCs and RSSB, there is a clear message; unauthorised use of this equipment in the wrong circumstances can have catastrophic consequences. Jardine stated that there have been incidents within ScotRail where investigations confirmed that the use of technology had contributed to Driver inattention and distraction. He also explained that there have been incidents where the main cause has been inattention and in some of these, ScotRail could not rule out the use of technology as a potential factor.



Alan Jardine

ScotRail are trying to prevent any further occurrences by ensuring that staff understand what the risks are. Here are just some of the statistics rolled out as part of their awareness program:

- At least 37 SPADS have been attributed to mobile phone use in recent years
- Using your mobile phone can slow down your reaction time by 50%
- You are 23 times more likely to have an accident if using a mobile device

ScotRail has also issued two DVDs which highlight potential risks involved in using mobile technology at work. Later this year, we will look further into the scientific explanation of human error with a specific focus on how the limitations of human attention can cause major rule violations which may result in catastrophic accidents and employee fatalities in the rail industry.

RSSB are currently conducting a survey to ascertain any trends in views across the industry.

RSSB want your views on the attitudes and behaviour relating to mobile phone use.

An education programme has been introduced to address the potential risk of using a mobile phone when driving a train. Using a mobile phone could lead to impaired Driver performance and the increased likelihood of incidents such as SPADs.

However, train driving is not the only safety critical role on the railway. There are other roles where the use of a mobile phone, or other electronic portable device, could have its own associated risks:

• Trackside: Using a mobile phone could impair decision-making and lead to Track Workers moving outside safe positions of work, potentially being struck by a train.

• Train dispatch: Distraction from a mobile phone during train dispatch could lead to a failure in executing the dispatch procedure correctly, resulting in a passenger incident or a SPAD.

• Signalling: The use of a mobile phone whilst in a control room risks an error that could lead to a failure or incident, or distract others doing safety critical work.

As part of research project T989 ('Safety-critical (non-driving) education programme on mobile phone risk'), RSSB and URS are currently investigating the requirements for an education programme designed to reduce the incidence of inappropriate use of portable electronic devices by any safety critical role. The outcome will be an effective, standardised and fit-for-purpose education campaign and materials that can be used by industry to augment their existing strategies related to mobile phone use.

The project is starting with a survey of the current attitudes and behaviours regarding mobile phone use by staff roles across the industry. This is where we need your help!

Some companies will be distributing paper copies of the questionnaire or you can complete it online by going to:

www.surveymonkey.com/s/RSSBMobilePhoneUse

It should take approximately 15 minutes to complete. Your answers will remain anonymous, but you do not need to answer every question if you do not feel comfortable to do so.

We are interested in hearing from Station Staff, Control Room Staff, Track Workers, Mobile Operations Managers and any safety critical roles that are affected by the use of a mobile phone or other portable electronic device, such as iPads or other forms of tablet computer.

RSSB

Note from the Editor

Hello and welcome to the 3rd edition of the CIRAS newsletter for 2013. I hope that you found the last newsletter an informative read.

We have another packed edition this time with a lead article on the use of mobile phone devices in the workplace. This is a widely discussed topic and we welcome any feedback from you.

Based on your responses, we may even revisit this in a future edition! RSSB are conducting a survey on your views about the behaviour and attitudes towards mobile phone use in the rail industry.

www.surveymonkey.com/s/RSSBMobilePhoneUse

Visit here and have a go!

CIRAS have been out and about a lot over the last few months and you may have spotted us at Railtex! This will be continuing throughout the year with visits across the country.
I hope you find this edition as interesting as the last and as always, feel free to get in touch with any feedback or ideas.
I look forward to hearing from you.

Nicola Holman.
Editor.

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Contact details for survey

www.surveymonkey.com/s/RSSBMobilePhoneUse
Please send any enquiries to enquirydesk@rssb.co.uk

Dispatch procedure not being carried out correctly

Concern has been expressed that Guards working local services stopping at Nottingham station are not carrying out the dispatch procedure correctly.

THE CONCERN

Guards following incorrect dispatch procedure

Regular instances where Guards have not stepped off the train to look down the length of the train or check the signal, or have not waited for the second tip from the Platform Staff, have been witnessed.

The employee feels that a culture has developed where some Guards cut corners whilst dispatching trains because the correct procedure has not been followed for some time.

RESPONSE FROM EAST MIDLANDS

In reply to the comments regarding train dispatch at Nottingham station, East Midlands Trains (EMT) have in place risk based train dispatch plans that comply with the recognised industry standards.

These plans have all been regularly briefed to the relevant staff and are frequently monitored to ensure that they are fully complied with.

This plan also forms the basis of initial training of these staff and is part of the competency management system.

Staff are also frequently reminded of the importance of reporting any incident.

We undertake robust monitoring to ensure all staff (Guards and Dispatchers) follow the procedures for that particular location.

EMT Dispatchers and Guards are encouraged to question any incorrect working or deviation from the original procedure and to point out that instruction is specified in their train dispatch plan and train working instructions.

Considerations for East Midlands Trains and CrossCountry:

- Clarify the correct procedure that Guards should follow when local services are being dispatched from Nottingham station
- Brief all Guards working on local services of the importance of adhering to the Rule Book for the correct dispatch procedure

RESPONSE FROM CROSSCOUNTRY

CrossCountry welcomes the report received via CIRAS and is always keen to improve dispatch of its trains and eliminate and reduce risk at the platform train interface.

All CrossCountry Senior Conductors and Train Managers (Guards), have been trained and briefed in the correct procedures applicable to train dispatch and are subject to ongoing performance assessment as part of the company Competence Management System (CMS).

We actively seek feedback on areas where anyone employed by the company is acting in an unsafe manner or doing something that will introduce risk into an activity or process.

We have received no reports in relation to dispatch at Nottingham station. We also undertake unobtrusive monitoring as part of the CMS and have not had cause for concern in this location.

Since receipt of your report we have undertaken unobtrusive monitoring at Nottingham station, and on those visits a very high standard of safe train operation was observed with good communication and excellent use of Rule Book hand signals for train positioning and dispatch.

We will continue to undertake unobtrusive monitoring not just at Nottingham but at all the station our trains call at. It is important that Senior Conductors and Train Managers continue to report all incidents as they occur to the Control, so we can quickly investigate and stop incidents similar to those raised by your reporter. ■

ACTIONS TAKEN BY CROSSCOUNTRY

- Undertaking unobtrusive monitoring at all stations.

Inadequate breaks at Thames Valley Signalling Centre

Concerns have been raised about staff at Thames Valley Signalling Centre (TVSC) not receiving adequate Personal Needs Breaks (PNBs).

THE CONCERNS

Staff working 12 hours without a PNB

It is commented that staff are at times expected to work 12 hours without a PNB, including during shifts throughout the night. This is largely due to staff shortages. The reporter comments that the cover available to relieve Signallers of their duties is inadequate. If staff need to use the restroom facilities, workstations could be left unmanned.

Staff becoming fatigued and anxious

There are concerns that due to the taxing nature of the work, staff are becoming fatigued and increasingly anxious at the potential risk of a fatigue related incident occurring.

Considerations for Network Rail:

- Make sure staff at TVSC receive adequate PNBs?
- Investigate whether additional cover is needed?

RESPONSE FROM NETWORK RAIL

Network Rail is grateful that these concerns have been brought to our attention.

We take the matter of staff welfare very seriously and are always eager to ensure that all employees have a safe and comfortable working environment.

Staff at the TVSC normally receive PNBs that exceed in length the minimum requirements detailed in the National Rostering Principles when a shift is fully staffed.

However, there have been a number of shifts over recent months which have experienced a shortage of staff. Having looked at the reasons behind this Network Rail has identified several root causes.

Firstly, there have been a number of vacancies at the TVSC over recent months, which has been largely due to difficulties in recruiting suitable individuals to fill the vacant positions.

Secondly, there has been an extremely high level of short-term sickness, as well as incidences of long-term sickness, which has exposed shifts to staff shortage. This is particularly an issue on the TVSC inner desks, although has impacted throughout the TVSC. For example, of the past 17 incidences of staff shortage on the inner desks, 16 of those have been due to sickness.

Fundamentally, Network Rail is keen to ensure that shifts are fully staffed where possible. As such, individuals from other locations, as well as Shift Signalling Managers, have been used wherever possible to cover a workstation.

This practice will continue and will be used whenever it is necessary. Network Rail is also committed to taking appropriate mitigation to make a short-staffed shifts as comfortable as possible.

We are committed to resolving the root causes that have been outlined above. To address the vacancies, we have recently recruited two new trainees, who will start on the inner desks within the coming month.

We also have two individuals who are close to being passed out on the outer desks and are encouraging staff to train on other TVSC workstations to allow contingency for cross cover. Network Rail is also in the process of addressing its training procedure. In particular, this will focus on how training is delivered and the need for current staff members to develop a more constructive relationship with trainees.

The second root cause has had the biggest impact on the covering of shifts at the TVSC and is something that we are keen to address. Members of staff have been referred to Bupa for assessments, which should help manage the medical requirements of the TVSC staff and help lead to a healthier workforce overall.

We hope that this response addresses the valid concerns raised. By addressing the root causes that have been identified with ongoing recruitment, effective training and sickness management, Network Rail hopes to minimise the occurrence of a shortage of staff in the future. ■

ACTIONS TAKEN BY NETWORK RAIL

- Ongoing recruitment, with two new trainees already in post.
- Current training procedures being addressed.
- Bupa assessments are taking place.

Human Factors on Fatigue

Fatigue is caused by a range of work and non-work factors, such as shift start time and duration, quality and timing of breaks, how long it takes to get to work, the workplace environment, the nature of the work, sleep disorders and family circumstances.

When people are tired they are more likely to make errors and become involved in operational incidents. RSSB research has found an increased likelihood of error during night and early morning shifts. However, breaks can help to control the build-up of fatigue. Research on fatigue and shiftwork has highlighted that:

- A 15 minute break should be provided after a maximum of four hours of work.
- Scheduling of breaks at the start or end of a shift reduces any beneficial effects; ideally they should be near the middle of the shift or at a suitable time in relation to the task.
- It is important that breaks give employees the opportunity to relax. This means being away from their usual task environment, with adequate rest facilities including food and drink.
- Inadequate breaks (in terms of timing and quality) have been linked to fatigue, poor health and dissatisfaction with the shift pattern.
- It is important to provide enough resources to cover breaks and other situations such as emergencies and unplanned events.

For more information on fatigue and how to manage fatigue risk, see Managing Fatigue - A Good Practice Guide which can be downloaded from the RGS Online website:

www.rgsonline.co.uk

Ten hour turns with no breaks away from the locomotive

An employee is concerned that Guards who work the Pickering to Grosmont turn at North Yorkshire Moors Railway (NYMR) are unable to take a Personal Needs Break (PNBs) away from the train on some of the 10 hour turns.

THE CONCERNS

Turns not allowing a PNB

The two turns which do not allow an adequate PNB during the shift are the 08.00 -18.00 and 09.15 - 19.17 turns. The reporter believes the lack of breaks on these turns is likely to cause fatigue and could contribute to mistakes being made.

Doors may not be full closed

It is important for Guards to remain vigilant during the entire turn, especially since the carriage doors have manually operated handles. An ever present safety risk for Guards is passengers failing to fully close the doors at stations.

The reporter believes that there are potentially several ways to alleviate the pressure on Guards on these turns.

NORTH YORKSHIRE MOORS RESPONSE

In relation to the old timetable, some Guards did not want to be rostered a break, but were happy to have their refreshments whilst on the train, rather than extend the length of duty.

We are pleased to report that all the Guards' turns now have a 20 minute rostered PNB. This has been built into all the Guards' turns for all the different period timetables, ie:- Green/Red/Gold/ Yellow Sunday and Silver Sunday.

We hope this goes some way to alleviate the concerns of the person who contacted CIRAS. ■

Considerations for North Yorkshire Moors Railway

- Review the timetable for the Pickering to Grosmont turns
- Add a turn to allow Guards to take rostered PNBs
- Provide more route knowledge training to create some flexibility within the roster

ACTIONS TAKEN BY NORTH YORKSHIRE MOORS RAILWAY

- All Guards now have a rostered PNB.

Signalling arrangements at Norton Bridge junction

Concerns have been raised about the practice of bringing Pendolinos and Super Voyagers travelling at 125mph to a stop at signal SC3612 protecting Norton Bridge junction. The main concern is that these trains are being stopped in order to allow slower trains to cross over the junction.

THE CONCERNS

Signals Passed at Danger (SPADs) could be caused

It is felt that this practice could lead to a SPAD as the signalling section between the banner repeater and the signal is short, meaning a full service brake application is required to stop at the signal in time. It is commented on that in the autumn and winter months when the rail head could be contaminated it is more likely that the train could slip past the signal.

Risk of accident amongst passengers or staff

A full service brake application could cause passengers or members of staff onboard the train to fall as the ride quality is affected.

The reporter believes that it is common practice to stop slower trains crossing over the main line and feels it would be safer if this practice were adopted at Norton Bridge junction.

RESPONSE FROM NETWORK RAIL

Could Network Rail clarify why trains are signalled in this way at Norton Bridge junction?

Trains are regulated at Norton Bridge junction in order to deliver the timetable. Although the trains crossing to/from Stoke pass over the junction at a lower speed they are capable of the same speeds as the trains which the reporter mentions in their question.

Trains have booked time slots in the timetable not only at stations but also junctions and the Signallers need to try and keep the trains in these booked paths to avoid them being in the wrong order. If trains are in the wrong order this affects the times at stations and junctions which delays the train and following train services.

Could Network Rail consider altering arrangements so that trains can pass over the junction without being signalled to stop in order to avoid the extreme braking?

We have to try and keep all train services within the time slots allotted in the timetable. Sometimes a service on the Up Fast Line will be running early and we cannot wait for the train to pass through the junction if this will delay a service waiting to cross at the junction.

We have checked the distance between signals on the approach to the junction and they are not what would be considered to be a short length. The way the signal sequence is set up on the approach to SC3612 should not result in extreme braking being required to stop at the signal.

We would like to check that we have the correct location as identified in the report as signal SC3612 does not have an associated banner repeater signal. ■

Lack of lighting at Tees Marshalling yard

A concern has been raised about the lack of lighting in the Up arrival and Down staging areas at Tees Marshalling yard.

THE CONCERNS

Lack of lighting could cause a trip and fall for staff

The floodlights in the yard have not worked for over a year. The concern is that during the hours of darkness, staff could

potentially trip and fall when working in these areas.

Staff are still required to marshall and shunt trains occasionally, which requires them to walk on the ballast away from the authorised walking route. The underfoot conditions in these areas are uneven and overgrown tendrils and bramble bushes create an added tripping hazard. This is of particular concern in the Down staging area.

Staff are using signalling lamps as torches, the concerned employee does not feel this is an adequate solution.

Considerations for DB Schenker

- Reinstate the floodlights at Tees Marshalling yard to full working order



RESPONSE FROM DB SCHENKER

The Area Production Manager for this location has investigated the report and responds that during 2009 the main electricity supply to Tees yard was destroyed by cable thieves when they broke into the main substation. This resulted in the main circuit being disconnected thus losing the power supply to the lighting columns. A generator was brought onto site to provide a power supply to the sections of the yard that required power.

During the autumn and winter of 2009 a risk assessment was carried out based on the falling light and the drop in traffic demand. This risk assessment highlighted that staff required additional lighting whilst carrying out train preparation duties. Portable headlamps were trialled and found suitable.

In 2011 the redundant Thornaby MPD building was demolished to reduce the risk of trespass in the area of the yard highlighted in the CIRAS report, a further risk assessment was carried out and due to low traffic levels it was found that the risk had not increased.

Following the recent introduction of the Performance Management Board at Tees yard, a concern was raised regarding the increase in traffic against the current lighting risk assessment.

A further risk assessment has now been completed, this time showing a marked increase in traffic. DB Schenker have investigated the options available due to the limited power supply and have identified that two lighting columns to the west of the over bridge could be reinstated.

This work will involve running two additional power supplies approx 150 metres each length to enable the installation of 12 additional lights in the area highlighted in this report.

The work is currently being planned and material sourced to allow the reinstatement of the lights. As an interim measure staff have been reissued with portable headlamps.

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ACTIONS TAKEN BY DB SCHENKER

- Two lighting columns will be reinstated.

Defective pit lamps at Bank station

Concerns have been raised about defective pit lamps on both the eastbound and westbound platforms of the Central line at Bank station.

THE CONCERNS

Better visibility required in high risk areas

Pit lamps are needed at stations where there is a large gap between the train and the platform to aid Driver visibility.

It is commented that the Central line platforms at Bank present a higher risk of passengers falling as the platforms are on a wide curve, creating a large gap.

Bulbs proving unreliable

It is believed that a large proportion of the bulbs in the pit lamps have blown on both the eastbound and westbound platforms. It is also commented that several of the lamp cases have broken. If the pit is not fully illuminated, Drivers have poorer visibility on their in-cab monitor and there is an increased risk of passenger injuries.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY LONDON UNDERGROUND

- LUL can confirm that at the time of response, the assets mentioned have undergone repair.

RESPONSE FROM LONDON UNDERGROUND

On receipt of the report, a review of Ellipse (the London Underground Asset Management System) was undertaken. It was found that 4 faults have been reported for these assets in the last 12 months. On average, closure of these faults has taken four days from the date they were reported.

LUL has found no reported faults for the issues raised within the CIRAS report. However, as a precaution the Electrical Maintenance Manager instructed all gap lighting to be re-lamped and damaged/cracked shades to be replaced. This action has been recorded on Ellipse (ref. 536508) to ensure that it is traceable and tracked through to completion.

If a member of staff identifies a failed asset, they should raise a fault with the Maintenance Control Centre who will log it in Ellipse and distribute to the appropriate maintainer for action. The number for the Bakerloo, Central and Victoria lines (BCV) desk is extension 1230. ■

Extended periods between rail vehicle examination checks

Concern has been expressed that the time taken between rail vehicle examination checks on London Underground rolling stock has been extended from 14 days to 23 days. There is the possibility this may be further increased to 28 days.

! THE CONCERNS

Potential increase in numbers of trains not fit for passenger service

When rail vehicle examinations take place the brakes, brake blocks and traction shoes are examined to ensure rolling stock is fit for passenger service.

The concern is that by extending the time between checks, there may be an increase in the usage of trains 'not fit for passenger service'.

Maintenance issues may go unaddressed

The employee believes in certain cases it may be acceptable to increase the time between checks, such as for new rolling stock.

However, by applying this policy to all rolling stock there is a risk that maintenance issues may go unaddressed for longer and increase the safety risk. Rolling stock over three years old is likely to require more maintenance than new rolling stock.

Considerations for London Underground

- Explain the reasoning behind extending the time between maintenance checks
- Share the full risk assessment for the check changes with staff
- Discuss if due consideration has been given to the age and condition of the rolling stock between checks

RESPONSE FROM LONDON UNDERGROUND

London Underground provides the following information in order to answer the concern about this very important issue.

The reason behind extending the time between checks is so that the maintenance is carried out when required, enabling us to work more effectively.

New control measures have been put in place so that the extended Level 2 maintenance periodicity continues to deliver safe and reliable rolling stock.

The risk assessment has been completed by LUL's specialist Rolling Stock Engineers using information on rolling stock component failures, stock consumable rates, open work orders, routine condition inspection results and casualty repairs.

Communication meetings are currently ongoing with Trade Union Representatives which allows them to see the risk assessment and ask the specialist Engineers questions about it. The trials conducted to date have been successful and there has been no indication that reliability, safety or availability has been reduced as a result of the changes.

Due consideration has been given to the age and condition of the rolling stock when carrying out the risk assessment. ■

ACTIONS TAKEN BY LONDON UNDERGROUND

- Communication meetings are currently ongoing with Trade Union Representatives.

How CIRAS works

One of the first questions people ask when they contact CIRAS is: Will the company know I have reported to you? The answer to this question is quite simply 'no'! We have never had any confidentiality breaches in 18 years of operation. Here's why!

The company will never know who has made the report.

How?

- We guarantee your confidentiality by ensuring we discuss every aspect of your concern with you.
- For very obvious reasons, your contact details are never shared with anyone outside the core CIRAS team.
- These contact details are locked in a safe overnight, with restricted access for a few individuals who work at CIRAS. They are never shared and never even leave the confidential room where telephone interviews are conducted.

How else do you offer confidentiality?

- It is not just your contact details that are guarded by us. We often remove certain information from a report if it could expose you in any way.
- If you were the only person who knew about an incident we would take that out of the report.
- There are many other things we remove from our written reports to ensure we are as good as our word. This may include the type of work you do and your location.
- We discuss in detail all previous attempts to report an issue to ensure we don't write anything that could identify you. If you have any doubts, we will not send the report at all.

Your confidentiality always comes first. Our team are very skilled at working out how best to protect you and our track record is proof of this.

Once we are satisfied that we have done everything necessary to protect your identity, we can send the report and follow up contact for a response. When this has been sent, you will be the first to hear and can provide us with feedback on whether the safety issue has been resolved. People often say getting closure on their safety issue is a weight off their minds. Reporting to CIRAS can make a real difference.

CONFIDENTIAL Reporting

Do you have any concerns about safety?

Have you tried internal reporting channels or don't feel that you can?

If so, please provide your contact details in the space below. Any information you provide will be treated as confidential.

We ask you to provide your name and contact details so that a CIRAS researcher can get in touch to discuss your report. Once your report is processed, your report form will be destroyed.

CIRAS will never reveal your personal information to anyone!

Name:

Job title:

Home phone no:

Company:

Mobile phone no:

Home address:

Convenient time to call:

Optional

If you would like to briefly describe your concern, please do so in the space provided below:

What happens next?

- A member of the CIRAS team will get in touch and discuss your health and safety concerns.
- A written report will be prepared on your behalf.
- We will make sure the report does not contain **ANY** information that can identify **YOU.**
- We then send the report to the relevant company for a response.
- Once we receive the company response we will then provide you with a copy.

CONFIDENTIAL

POSTAGE PAID

FREEPOST CIRAS

Fold Here and moisten inside to seal

no need to read between the lines

RIGHT track

No hidden messages – just plain and simple rail safety learning points shared in a down-to-earth magazine for anyone involved in operating the everyday railway

Right Track is made available in mess rooms, signing on points, stations, signalling centres, offices and depots.

You can also read Right Track on-line on Opsweb at www.opsweb.co.uk

righttrack@rssb.co.uk

RSSB